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Abstract
Dual track liberalization, relying upon the continued enforcement of existing con-
tracts and the simultaneous creation of a free market sector, represents a powerful
mechanism in economic reform. If not anticipated, the reform implements an outcome
that is both Pareto improving and eﬃciency enhancing as compared to the status quo.
We show that when the reform is anticipated, intertemporal arbitrage arises potentially
undermining these properties. Only when the original policy involves both price setting
and quantity restrictions can anticipated dual track liberalization maintain its attrac-
tiveness. These conditions correspond well to the circumstances faced by transition
economies.
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11 Introduction
The widespread failure to adopt socially beneﬁcial economic reforms can often be explained
by the distributional eﬀects of the new policy. More speciﬁcally, the existence of a powerful
group of ex-ante identiﬁable losers represents a formidable obstacle to economic liberaliza-
tion.1 Explicitly compensating the victims of the reform might well be then the only way
to guarantee widespread support. Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to identify, both in practice
and in theory, a mechanism that can achieve these results without requiring the government
to have a detailed knowledge of the fundamentals of the economy. In two recent papers
Lau, Qian, and Roland (1997), (2000) have shown how the simple dual–track mechanism
implemented in the Chinese economic reform served both the purpose of achieving a Pareto
improvement, as well as that of attaining an eﬃcient resource allocation.
The dual–track approach allows two regimes to coexist after a reform has been introduced.
First, it requires the government to enforce the contractual agreements in place prior to the
reform, so that transactions can continue to be executed at the original prices. Second, it
allows a new, liberalized sector to emerge, in which exchanges take place in a deregulated
market. The enforceability of preexisting contractual agreements ensures that none will be
worse oﬀ, while the possibility to engage in arbitrage activities, as Lau, Qian, and Roland
(2000) intriguingly demonstrate, can help the economy to attain the ﬁrst best allocation of
resources.
Limiting the government role to guarantee the enforcement of already existing contracts,
dual–track liberalization represents a very promising approach to successfully implement
an eﬃciency-enhancing reform, that does not involve the creation of victims. Indeed, this
approach has been widely regarded as a major catalyst for China’s remarkable economic
performance in recent decades (Li (1999)). Given its theoretical appeal and its proven
1Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and Alesina and Drazen (1991) suggest possible explanations of the delay
in implementing reforms, while Dewatripont and Roland (1992a 1992b, 1995) discuss mechanisms that can
be used to overcome the resistance to the introduction of a reform.
1record of success, it is natural to ask whether this mechanism can be successfully applied
to other economies involved in the liberalization process. Under what circumstances is
dual track liberalization more likely to achieve the consensus needed for the implementation
of a reform? Are there situations in which the use of such a mechanism should not be
recommended to a policy maker? These are the questions that motivate this paper.
To address these issues, we extend the analysis of Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) in
several directions. First, while they considered only the liberalization of transactions that
were originally carried out between the private sector and the government, in this paper
we generalize the pre–reform environment, to include exchanges carried out between private
parties, with the possibility of a government intervention. In particular, since the transition
process involves the opening up to the market system both domestically and internationally,
we extend the analysis of Lau, Qian, and Roland (1997) and (2000) by considering also the
eﬀects of removing distortions to international trade. In doing so, we are able to study the
eﬀectiveness of the dual track approach to liberalize a regulated market economy, and not
just a centrally planned one. Secondly, we recognize that political support for a reform needs
to be built even before its implementation. In other words, the design of a reform has to take
into account that policies aimed at achieving a Pareto improvement and at building popular
support for the liberalization process are in most circumstances rationally anticipated by the
private sector. The central issue then becomes whether anticipated dual track liberalization
can retain the appealing features of being both eﬃciency-enhancing and Pareto-improving
from a dynamic perspective. As it turns out, this is not always going to be the case, and
we will identify the institutional settings in which the mechanism is likely to maintain its
appealing characteristics. In doing so, we hope to provide useful suggestions concerning the
applicability of this mechanism.
Hence, our paper provides a theoretical framework for the welfare analysis of reform
mechanisms in a dynamic setting, in which private agents rationally anticipate a future
reform. By considering the removal of a broad set of government interventions, the scope for
2application of our framework is vast. We show that the introduction of expectations crucially
aﬀects the welfare properties of the dual track mechanism we analyze, and furthermore, we
highlight how in a dynamic setting only reform packages that are aimed at simultaneously
removing multiple distortions (i.e. both price and quantity controls) are likely to be both
Pareto improving and eﬃciency enhancing.
The very nature of dual track reform implies the existence of two diﬀerent transaction
environments after the reform is implemented, one constrained by pre-existing contractual
agreements, i.e. by the original distortionary government policies, and another completely
free of state intervention. A key insight emerging from our analysis is that, when dual track
liberalization is anticipated, the diﬀerences in the transaction environments create incentives
for private agents to engage in inter-temporal arbitrage. Using a two-period model in which
private agents anticipate in the ﬁrst period a dual track liberalization in the second, we show
that private agents will distort their ﬁrst period behavior to exploit better transaction con-
ditions after the reform. In some contexts, this distortion can exacerbate the eﬃciency loss
generated by the existing government policy, making dual track liberalization less eﬃcient
than no liberalization at all. Furthermore, such distortion may also impact the transaction
conditions prior to the reform, thus generating potential distributional consequences, that
in turn may also create losers under the anticipated liberalization.
Only when the original government intervention is “highly pervasive”, i.e. it involves both
price setting and quantity restrictions, and the reform simultaneously removes both distor-
tions, can dual track liberalization retain the eﬃciency-enhancing and Pareto-improving
properties. Price setting is necessary for a Pareto improvement to be achieved. Quantity
intervention allows us to deﬁne conditions under which intertemporal arbitrage actually alle-
viates the ﬁrst period distortion, thus making the reform eﬃciency enhancing. We therefore
provide conditions under which the analysis of dual track reform by Lau, Qian, and Roland
(1997), (2000) remains robust in a dynamic context.
Our research complements the work of Lau, Qian, and Roland (1997) and (2000). By
3allowing the reform to be anticipated in a dynamic context, we take into account that a dual
track reform is likely to be implemented as a gradual and evolving process, as in it was the
case of China, where the issue has been the subject of heated discussions both in the academic
and in the policy circles (Zhang (1985), Wu and Zhao (1987), Byrd (1991)). Our paper also
helps further the understanding of the more general question of the design of economic
reforms in transition economies. For instance, while Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992)
have shown that for dual track reform to be eﬃciency enhancing, contractual enforcement
is critical, our analysis demonstrates that enforcement is only a necessary condition for
anticipated dual track liberalization to bring about both a Pareto-improving and eﬃciency
enhancing outcome. What is also needed is that either the reform comes as a surprise or
that it involves the simultaneous removal of multiple distortions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the simple two–
period supply and demand model used to carry out the analysis. We proceed by using
backward induction. In section 3, we study the second period resource allocation after
the dual track liberalization is implemented. We show that regardless of the nature of
the original government policy, the resource allocation attains the ﬁrst-best outcome in the
second period. In section 4, we then examine the resource allocation in the ﬁrst period
under a set of diﬀerent government policies, and compare the two-period outcomes under
the anticipated reform with the status quo. We ﬁrst consider (section 4.1) the case in which
the original intervention involves only one dimension (either price or quantity), followed by
the analysis of the simultaneous removal of multiple distortions (section 4.2). Section 5
concludes the analysis.
2 The Model
To introduce our analysis in the simplest possible framework, we follow Lau, Qian, and
Roland (2000), and use a partial equilibrium setup, in which a continuum of buyers and
producers each demand and supply one and only one unit of a commodity. All buyers
4and producers are price-takers. In order to analyze the eﬀects of anticipated dual track
liberalization, we consider a two–period model. In the ﬁrst period, the market is distorted
by a government policy, that might involve direct price setting, quotas, taxes or subsidies.
In the second period the government implements a reform aimed at removing this distortion.
Buyers’ preferences are time separable and invariant, and producers’ costs remain constant
over time. Both sets of agents have a discount factor ±, and the commodity is assumed to
be perishable.
To minimize potential opposition, the government introduces a reform that implements
a dual track liberalization in the second period. Two tracks, the regulated track and the the
market track, emerge as a result of such a reform. In the regulated track, private agents are
assigned rights and obligations derived from the ﬁrst period transactions, which were carried
out under the original government policy. That is, if private agents made an exchange of
a given quantity at a certain price in the ﬁrst period, the very same transaction will be
enforced in the second period. One way to think of this mechanism is that contracts are
written between private parties involved in the transactions. These contracts record the
identities of the parties, the quantity transacted, and the price. Dual track liberalization
then requires these contracts to be enforceable in court in the second period. In addition,
if the original government policy involved a transfer (i.e. a tax or a subsidy) to an agent in
the ﬁrst period, the same payment will be made in the second. Simultaneously, the reform
calls for the establishment of a market track, where parties can exchange at the prevailing
free market price, even to fulﬁll the obligations deriving from contracts written in the ﬁrst
period.
An appealing feature of the dual track liberalization mechanism is that it requires very
little information on the part of the government. This characteristic diﬀerentiates it from the
standard lump sum redistributions schemes, often invoked to implement a Pareto improving
reform. Such schemes, while theoretically appealing, have proved impractical, requiring
information on preferences and initial endowments of the agents that are diﬃcult, if not
5impossible for the government to obtain.2 If dual track is used instead, only if the original
government intervention involved a tax or a subsidy does the policy maker need to have
any information at all on the private agents to carry out the liberalization. In this case, it
needs to know the identities of the parties that were taxed or subsidized, and the amount it
transferred in the ﬁrst period, to reproduce the very same transfers after the liberalization.
Otherwise, the content of the contract between the private parties has to be revealed only
in court and in case of a dispute.
Key to our analysis is that private agents anticipate in the ﬁrst period the implementation
of the dual track reform in the second. As a result, the equilibrium resource allocation in
the ﬁrst period is determined not only by the original distortionary policy, but also by
the second period reform. Therefore, when evaluating dual track liberalization, we need
to consider its welfare implications over both periods. Speciﬁcally, we will compare the
equilibrium allocation under dual track liberalization to the status quo (i.e., no liberalization
outcome). We say that the reform is eﬃciency–enhancing or dominates from the point of
view of social welfare the status quo if the total (discounted) surplus over the two periods is
greater under the reform than under the status quo. Furthermore, dual track liberalization
achieves a Pareto improvement over the status quo if the total (discounted) surplus of each
private agent over the two periods is greater under dual track than under the status quo.
3 The Second Period Resource Allocation
We begin our analysis by solving for the equilibrium in the second period. In the second
period, it is useful to distinguish between two sets of agents: those who have transacted in the
ﬁrst period and those who have not. Previously active agents must carry out their original
transactions, as required by the dual track liberalization mechanism. However, they can do
so through intratemporal arbitrage, i.e. by taking advantage of the existence of the market
2Hammond (1979) has actually shown that lump sum redistribution is incentive incompatible.
6track without actually producing or using the commodity. Consider for instance buyers who
were active before the reform was implemented. These agents will be better oﬀ reselling
in the market track the commodities they acquired from the regulated track, rather than
actually using them, if and only if their marginal willingness to pay is below the prevailing
free-market price P e. This implies that the overall quantity consumed in the two tracks will
be derived from those buyers with a marginal willingness to pay larger than P e. A similar
argument can be made with respect to producers. That is, for a given P e, the total quantity
produced in the two tracks will be generated only by those producers with a marginal cost
lower than P e. This further implies that, in equilibrium, the free-market price must be at
the level where the marginal cost equals the marginal willingness to pay, independently of
the original government policy. We therefore conclude:
Lemma 1 Regardless of the ﬁrst period government policy, dual track liberalization attains
the ﬁrst best allocation in the second period. Moreover, the equilibrium price in the market
track is the same as the competitive equilibrium price.
Agents engaged in transaction before liberalization took place are entitled to continue
to carry them out in the second period, and can do so by taking advantage of the newly
established market track. Previously inactive agents can now voluntarily engage in new
transactions. In addition, dual track liberalization requires the same transfer payments to
be made between the government and the private agents in the second period. This implies
that in the second period the scheme is Pareto improving as compared to the status quo.
4 The First Period Allocation, Expectations and Wel-
fare
In our dynamic context, the ﬁrst period allocation crucially depends on the assumptions made
concerning private agents’ expectations. Translating the static discussion of Lau, Qian, and
7Roland (2000) to our dynamic framework, what sets our analysis apart is that while we allow
for the reform to be anticipated, they consider the case in which the liberalization comes
as a “surprise”. In that context, the ﬁrst period outcome is not aﬀected by the ensuing
liberalization. Intratemporal arbitrage, as deﬁned in the previous section, will then ensure
that even from a dynamic perspective the reform is both eﬃciency enhancing and Pareto
improving as compared to the status quo.
If the reform is anticipated, private agents may be induced to strategically modify their
behavior in the ﬁrst period in order to take advantage of new arbitrage opportunities. These
opportunities arise because dual track liberalization creates two tracks in the second period,
and agents who have engaged in transactions in the ﬁrst period are entitled to exchange
in the regulated track in the second. Since the prices prevailing in the two tracks may
very well diﬀer, agents are likely to be interested in taking advantage of such diﬀerences
by modifying their ﬁrst period behavior. To diﬀerentiate these arbitrage activities from
those arising in the second period, we refer to them as inter-temporal arbitrage. Notice that
intra-temporal arbitrage is not arbitrage between diﬀerent prices, whereas inter-temporal
arbitrage is. While intra-temporal arbitrage helps to create winners and restore eﬃciency,
inter-temporal arbitrage may not, as we will show next.
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium resource allocation in the ﬁrst period. By com-
bining this with the equilibrium resource allocation in the second, we evaluate the question
as to whether, from a dynamic perspective, anticipated dual track liberalization is eﬃciency
enhancing and Pareto improving as compared to the status quo. As it turns out, the answer
to this question depends crucially on whether the original government policy involves an in-
tervention in a single dimension (i.e., price intervention or quantity intervention) or in dual
dimensions (i.e., price-cum-quantity intervention).
84.1 Single Intervention
When the original policy involves either price or quantitative restrictions alone, we can show
that the anticipated dual track liberalization can never be both eﬃciency enhancing and
Pareto improving.
4.1.1 Price Intervention
We begin with price intervention. We consider a closed economy, in which the government
intervention takes either the form of direct price setting or that of a subsidy.3
Consider ﬁrst the case of price setting. Let P be price ﬁxed by the government in the
ﬁrst period. Assume that this policy results in excessive demand or, in other words, that
supply is binding. As it is illustrated in Figure 1, the second period free-market price P e is
then higher than P. In the ﬁrst period, the quantity exchanged will be Q if agents do not
anticipate future policy changes. This quantity falls short of the market-clearing quantity
Qe.
The diﬀerence between P and P e implies that, if a supplier and a buyer enter an exchange
in the ﬁrst period, under dual track liberalization they will be locked into a lower price in
the second. In contrast, they will be able to carry out transactions at a higher price in the
second period if they do not exchange in the ﬁrst. Intertemporal arbitrage will induce the
ﬁrst period supply to shrink, while demand will expand, as shown by S0 and D0 in Figure 1.4
By refusing to enter an exchange in the ﬁrst period, a producer who would be supplying the
Qth unit of the commodity loses a net proﬁt equal to P ¡ S¡1(Q) in the ﬁrst period, but
gains an amount P e ¡ P in the second. On the other hand, a user who would be buying
3We do not analyze dual track liberalization when the original intervention is a tax. The removal of a tax
will in fact necessarily decrease the price paid by the users, and increase the price received by suppliers in the
second period, eliminating in this way the need for implementing a measure that is designed to compensate
those agents that are negatively aﬀected by the reform.
4Notice that, diﬀerently from S and D, the supply S0 and the demand D0 incorporate intertemporal
arbitrage motives and therefore do not have the usual correspondence to the marginal utility and marginal
cost.
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Figure 1: Price setting with binding supply
the Qth unit of the commodity, loses the amount P ¡ D¡1(Q) by strategically increasing
his demand in the ﬁrst period, and gains an amount of P e ¡ P in the second. Notice that
these gains are due purely to the rights and obligations arising from dual track liberalization,
and not to the ability to transfer resources over time. Let Qd
1S and Qd
1D respectively be the
quantity supplied and demanded in the ﬁrst period under dual track liberalization. The
inter-temporal arbitrage implies that in equilibrium:
P ¡ S
¡1(Q
d
1S) = ±(P
e ¡ P) (1)
P ¡ D
¡1(Q
d
1D) = ±(P
e ¡ P) (2)
Equation (1) indicates that if liberalization entails a price increase for the producers, i.e.,
P e > P, then supply in the ﬁrst period will shrink, resulting in the cost of the marginal
producer to be less than the ﬁrst period price, i.e. S¡1(Qd
1S) < P, and vice versa. Equation
(2) describes the corresponding condition for buyers. The equilibrium quantity transacted
10in the ﬁrst period under dual track liberalization, Qd
1, is then given by:
Q
d
1 = minfQ
d
1S;Q
d
1Dg
and naturally, Qd
1 = Qd
1S in this case as we have assumed the supply to be binding.
Since inter-temporal arbitrage causes supply to shrink in the ﬁrst period, Qd
1 < Q. At
the same time demand expands, and the reduction in the quantity exchanged must imply
that additional users are rationed out. Without liberalization, these users would purchase
the commodity at the price P in both periods. With liberalization, they are rationed out in
the ﬁrst period and will purchase the commodity at the price P e > P in the second. Thus
even inter–temporally, these users must be worse-oﬀ as compared to the status quo. Dual
track liberalization can therefore not be Pareto improving in the dynamic sense.
Notice also that, compared to the status quo, inter-temporal arbitrage induces an addi-
tional eﬃciency loss in the ﬁrst period, as it exacerbates the shortage. However, this loss
must be weighted against the eﬃciency gain achieved by dual track liberalization in the
second period. We can then derive the following conclusion, which holds also for the case of
binding demand:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the government status quo policy is price setting. Then antic-
ipated dual track liberalization is never Pareto improving. From the point of view of social
welfare, it is dominated by the status quo if
±(Q
e ¡ Q) · Q ¡ Q
d
1: (3)
Proof. We only need to prove the eﬃciency result since we have already shown that antici-
pated dual track liberalization does not lead to a Pareto improvement. We focus on the case
of binding supply, with the assistance of Figure 1. Notice that the eﬃciency loss in the ﬁrst
period is bounded below by (D¡1(Q)¡S¡1(Q))(Q¡Qd
1), whereas the eﬃciency gain in the
second is bounded above by (D¡1(Q) ¡ S¡1(Q))(Qe ¡ Q). Therefore, the dual track is not
11eﬃciency enhancing if ±(Qe ¡ Q) · Q ¡ Qd
1. QED.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the government intervenes ex ante through price setting. Then
anticipated dual track liberalization is always dominated by the status quo if demand and
supply are linear.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the government intervention takes the form of direct price setting, rationing
emerges either because demand or supply are binding. As we have shown, the inter-temporal
arbitrage resulting from the anticipation of dual track liberalization will exacerbate the prob-
lem, making a Pareto improvement impossible. It becomes then natural to question whether
the scheme will be Pareto improving, if the government policy allows market clearing, as in
the case of a subsidy.
Under this policy, the second period price prevailing in the market track is higher than
the ﬁrst-period price faced by users, and lower than that received by producers, as illustrated
in Figure 2. As a result, the anticipation of the reform induces agents to strategically increase
both supply and demand in the ﬁrst period. This increase in transactions exacerbates the
eﬃciency loss in the ﬁrst period, shown in Figure 2 as Qd
1 > Q. Weighing this loss against
the second period gain, we ﬁnd a condition similar to the one described for the price setting
case, under which the anticipated dual track liberalization is dominated by the status quo.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the government’s status quo intervention takes the form of a
subsidy. Then
a.) Anticipated dual track liberalization is dominated by the status quo if condition (3) holds
b.) It is not Pareto improving unless for a given Q and P e, there exists a corresponding Qd
1
that simultaneously solves the following two equations:
±S
¡1(Q
e) + S
¡1(Q
d
1) = (1 + ±)S
¡1(Q); (4)
±D
¡1(Q
e) + D
¡1(Q
d
1) = (1 + ±)D
¡1(Q): (5)
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Figure 2: Subsidy
Proof. See Appendix.
According to our result, all agents (excluding of course the government) will be at least as
well oﬀ under anticipated dual track liberalization as under the status quo if and only if Qd
1
satisﬁes both equation (4) and (5). Since a system of two equations in one unknown does not
admit in general a solution, this proposition suggests that only in rare occasions will the ﬁrst
period price remain unchanged under anticipated dual track liberalization. Mathematically,
these situations arise when one of the two equations (4) and (5) is redundant. Economically,
this translates in either the demand and supply being linear, or the supply being perfectly
elastic at least on the segment between Qd
1 and Qe.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the government’s ex ante intervention takes the form of a sub-
sidy. Anticipated dual track liberalization makes all agents at least as well oﬀ as without
liberalization when one of the following two conditions holds:
a.) demand and supply are both linear
13b.) either demand or supply is inﬁnitely elastic at least for the segment between Qd
1 and Qe.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 can be applied to the case of a small
open economy, where either the supply or demand will be inﬁnitely elastic, and similar results
can be obtained. Indeed, in the context of our analysis, the only diﬀerence between a closed
economy and a small open economy is that in the former the government intervention applies
to all producers (buyers), while in the latter the intervention is only concerned with foreign
producers (buyers).
4.1.2 Quantity Intervention
Let us now turn to quantity interventions. Without loss of generality, consider the intro-
duction of a binding quota. In this case, the ﬁrst period status-quo price, P, is higher than
the second period free-market price P e, as illustrated in Figure 3. Strategic responses from
both buyers and sellers cause the ﬁrst period supply to increase from S to S0 and the ﬁrst
period demand to decrease from D to D0. Consequently, the ﬁrst period equilibrium price
P d
1 is bound to be less than P, and therefore some producers will be worse oﬀ.
Notice that as it is illustrated in Figure 3 the increase in supply is symmetric to the
decrease in demand, and the quantity exchanged in the ﬁrst period remains constant despite
the inter-temporal arbitrage eﬀorts.5 In other words, the distortion-enhancing eﬀect of in-
5To show that indeed the quantity transacted in the ﬁrst period does not change as a result of dual track
liberalization, we argue that Qd
1 cannot fall short of Q. Suppose this is not the case, i.e. suppose that
Qd
1 < Q. Pd
1 must then clear the market in the ﬁrst period when the dual track liberalization is anticipated,
implying that
S0¡1(Qd
1) = D0¡1(Qd
1) (6)
Intertemporal arbitrage implies that
S¡1(Qd
1) ¡ S0¡1(Qd
1) = ±(S0¡1(Qd
1) ¡ Pe);
D¡1(Qd
1) ¡ D0¡1(Qd
1) = ±(D0¡1(Qd
1) ¡ Pe):
and using equation 6 we have S¡1(Qd
1) = D¡1(Qd
1). In other words, Qd
1 is the market clearing quantity
under the status quo as well. Given the assumption that Qd
1 < Q1, the ﬁrst period quota cannot be binding
and we have a contradiction.
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Figure 3: Quota
tertemporal arbitrage we have highlighted in the case of a price intervention, does not exist
in this case, and anticipated dual track liberalization is eﬃciency enhancing as compared to
the status quo.
The next proposition summarizes our discussion.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the status quo government intervention takes the form of a
binding quota. Then the anticipated dual track liberalization is eﬃciency-enhancing. How-
ever, some agents will be worse-oﬀ under the anticipated liberalization than under the status
quo.
This result highlights that also when the initial government’s policy involves a quan-
titative restriction, the dual–track mechanism is not successful in ensuring the necessary
consensus for the reform. As in the case of a tax/subsidy, our discussion of the removal
of a quota by means of a dual track mechanism can be directly extended to a small open
economy in which foreign imports are constrained, by assuming a portion of the supply to
be perfectly elastic.
154.2 Dual Intervention
The analysis we have outlined up to this point has identiﬁed a set of circumstances in
which dual–track liberalization does not represent an eﬀective tool in the hands of a policy
maker interested in market oriented reforms. In these circumstances the mechanism fails
either to retain its eﬃciency enhancing nature, or its Pareto improving characteristic when
liberalization is anticipated.
However, in all the cases we have considered so far, the status quo government policy
involves a single intervention, taking either the format of a quantity restriction, or that of
a price distortion. A natural question is then whether dual track liberalization can be both
Pareto–improving and eﬃciency-enhancing when the original government policy involves
both quantity and price interventions. This is a particularly relevant issue since heavy gov-
ernment interventions in both dimensions have characterized many transition and developing
economies prior to market liberalization. This has been true both in product and factor mar-
kets. For instance, in centrally planned economies like China or the Soviet Union the labor
market saw the planning authority allocating workers to speciﬁc production units, as well as
ﬁxing their wage rates. At the same time, many poor countries followed import substitution
development strategies, involving the exclusion of foreign competitors on the one hand and
the introduction of price–distortionary measures like taxes, subsidies, price ceilings etc. on
the other.
To address this question, we consider next a case where the government of a small
economy forecloses its market to foreign competition, while at the same time introducing
taxes/subsidies or direct price interventions. Later we will present in a more general set-
ting the conditions under which anticipated dual track liberalization is an eﬀective reform
mechanism, i.e. it achieves an eﬃciency-enhancing as well as Pareto-improving outcome.
164.2.1 Domestic cum trade liberalization
In the ﬁrst case we consider, dual track liberalization removes a government’s distortionary
tax (subsidy) while at the same time opening a small closed economy to international trade.
As before, let P and P ¡t respectively be the price paid by a user and received by a supplier
in the status quo, i.e. in the presence of a tax under autarky. Naturally, the second period
free-market price P e equals the price prevailing in the international market. Notice that if
P e 2 [P ¡t;P] dual track liberalization is not needed to achieve a Pareto improvement. For
this reason, we restrict our attention to scenarios in which either P e > P or P e < P ¡ t.
Two main lessons can be learned from the analysis.
First, intertemporal arbitrage exacerbates the ﬁrst period distortion introduced by the
tax (subsidy). To see this point consider the arbitrage conditions
P
d
1D ¡ D
¡1(Q
d
1) = ±(P
e ¡ P
d
1D) (7)
P
d
1S ¡ S
¡1(Q
d
1) = ±(P
e ¡ P
d
1S) (8)
where P d
1D and P d
1S are respectively the ﬁrst period equilibrium price faced by the user and
received by the producer when dual track liberalization is anticipated. Rearranging, we have
S
¡1(Q
d
1) ¡ D
¡1(Q
d
1) = (1 + ±)(P
d
1S ¡ P
d
1D) = (1 + ±)t: (9)
In other words, the wedge between the marginal beneﬁt and the marginal cost increases when
the policy is anticipated. This in turn implies that Qd
1 < Q, or in other words, intertemporal
arbitrage induces an additional distortion in the ﬁrst period.
Second, the policy will not be Pareto improving, even if we consider only the perspective
of the private agents. For private agents not to be worse oﬀ, buyers which continue to take
part in the exchange when dual track liberalization is anticipated should not face a higher
price in the ﬁrst period than they would under the status quo. Similarly, continuously active
sellers should not face a lower price. This requires both demand and supply to shift to the
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Figure 4: Domestic tax and trade liberalization under dual track
left, because the wedge between marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt increases as a result of
intertemporal arbitrage. However, this is not possible when either P e > P or P e < P ¡ t.
We can then reach the following conclusion:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the status-quo policy chosen by the government is a tax (sub-
sidy) in autarky. Then the anticipated dual track liberalization is not Pareto improving, but
is possibly eﬃciency enhancing.
Notice that autarky amounts to the government setting an import quota equal to zero.
It is easy to show that the results obtained in Proposition 4 continue to hold even if the
binding quota is strictly positive. The main message is that when dual intervention involves
a tax or subsidy which allows market clearing, anticipated dual track liberalization cannot
be both eﬃciency enhancing and Pareto–improving.
Next, we will consider the case in which the status quo policy involves price ﬁxing, and
hence rationing of either excessive demand or supply, with foreign suppliers involuntarily
18excluded by an import quota.6 As it turns out, in this case, dual track liberalization can be
simultaneously Pareto–improving and eﬃciency–enhancing even when it is anticipated. In
particular, intertemporal arbitrage can actually alleviate the ﬁrst period distortion induced
by the original government policy. In other words, we can identify conditions under which
intertemporal arbitrage will relax in the ﬁrst period the rationing implied by the government’s
price ﬁxing, making dual track liberalization Pareto–improving. This result is summarized
in the following
Proposition 5 Suppose that the status quo policy chosen by the government is domestic
price ﬁxing, combined with an import quota. Let P be the domestic target price ﬁxed by
the government. Then, domestic cum trade liberalization is Pareto improving and eﬃciency
enhancing if and only if one of the following two conditions holds:
a.) P e > P and S0(P) + q ¸ D(P)
b.) P e < P and D0(P) ¸ S(P) + q
Proof. We ﬁrst establish the suﬃciency for part a:) using Figure 5 as an illustration. Since
P e > P, demand increases and supply decreases because of arbitrage, and in particular
S0(P) + q < S(P) + q. Furthermore, given that the supply does not fall short of the
demand, i.e. S0(P) + q ¸ D(P), the demand must be binding without liberalization, i.e.
S(P) + q > D(P). Therefore
Q
d
1 = minfS
0(P) + q;D
0(P)g ¸ minfS(P) + q;D(P)g = Q
6This regime for instance broadly describes the pre–1978 Chinese Foreign Trade Corporations (FTC)
system. The trading enterprises were tightly controlled by the government through foreign trade planning,
which issued mandatory targets. Very often those targets were worked out in great detail, both with respect
to the type of good to be traded, as well as to the quantity to be transacted. At the same time domestic prices
were completely divorced from world market prices through an arbitrary internal pricing system, aimed at
insulating domestic companies from international price ﬂuctuations. The relevant FTC would procure the
export good at the internal price set by the government, and resell it in the international market at the
prevailing price. Any discrepancy between the foreign price (converted at the oﬃcial exchange rate) and the
domestic target price would represent a proﬁt or a loss for the FTC, which would then be absorbed by the
State as either a proﬁt delivery or a subsidy. For more on this, see Chai (1997).
19Since the price does not change and the expansion of output is voluntary for both buyers and
sellers at the margin, all agents must be weakly better oﬀ. The same argument applies for
part b. We now turn to the necessary condition. Suppose that P e > P, but S0(P)+q < D(P).
Then Qd
1 < Q and hence some buyers will be rationed out as a result of such arbitrage. The
same logic applies to part b:). QED.
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Figure 5: Domestic price and trade liberalization under dual track
An interesting comparison can be drawn between the last result and Proposition 1. In
the latter, we considered the eﬀect of removing only a price control, and we showed that
intertemporal arbitrage exacerbated the ﬁrst period distortion, by further reducing the quan-
tity exchanged. To the contrary, when liberalization involves the removal of both the price
control and the import quota, it may reduce the distortions in the ﬁrst period, allowing the
quantity exchanged to increase. The key to such a diﬀerence lies in the fact that when the
government’s status quo policy involves only a price control, there is a close relation between
whether demand or supply is binding at the government-ﬁxed price, and the direction in
which the price will change after the introduction of the reform. For instance, if the status
quo policy involves only price setting and supply is binding in the ﬁrst period, the price must
increase after liberalization, inducing the ﬁrst period supply to shrink even further. This
20linkage breaks down, however, when the status quo policy involves both a price control and
an import quota. Consider again the case of binding supply. The prevailing price after liber-
alization is determined in the international market, and can be anywhere below the autarky
price. In particular, if the international market price is below the government ﬁxed domestic
price, the anticipated removal of both price and import restrictions induces the supply to
increase, rather than shrink in the ﬁrst period. Naturally, the results of Proposition 5 apply
also to the case of an export quota.
4.2.2 Price controls and involuntary participation/exclusion
The positive result we have obtained for the simultaneous removal of price and quantity
restrictions can be generalized. We show next that anticipated dual track liberalization is
likely to be both Pareto–improving and eﬃciency–enhancing only when the original gov-
ernment intervention is highly pervasive, i.e. it involves both price setting and involuntary
participation/exclusion. By involuntary exclusion we intend those situations in which an
agent would be willing to undertake an exchange at the prevailing price, but it is not allowed
to do so ex imperio, i.e. as a result of a prohibition by the authorities. Common examples
are import quotas – as we have just discussed – or voluntary export restraints, entry barriers,
politically or ideologically motivated restrictions etc. Similarly, by involuntary participation,
we refer to those situations where agents would not be willing to engage in a transaction
given the prevailing price, but are forced to do so by government ﬁat, as was often observed
in centrally planned economies.
Let e S and f D respectively be the total supply and demand by agents who involuntarily
and voluntarily engage in transactions under the status quo. We illustrate these functions
in Figure 6 where we assume for simplicity that all users choose voluntarily whether to
transact. In Figure 6, some producers with very high marginal cost are forced to supply in
the status quo. These producers are represented by the leftmost portion of e S. The rest of
the producers, represented by the monotonic portion of e S, make supply decisions voluntarily.
21This is a typical phenomenon in a centrally planned economy, where the government may
order high cost producers (such as state-owned enterprises) to deliver the commodity simply
because it has no knowledge of their true marginal cost (Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000)).
Lacking information on the fundamentals of the economy, the planner sets the price at an
arbitrary level P which in our example happens to generate an excess supply, in the sense
that e S(P) > f D(p). Notice that the free-market price P e that prevails in the market track in
the second period bears no relationship with the price at which e S = f D. This is because an
arbitrary number of producers are involuntarily forced to participate in transactions due to
the original government intervention.
Since P e and the price at which f D = e S are not related, it becomes possible for P e > P
while e S(P) > f D(P). When P e > P, intertemporal arbitrage implies that the supply will
decrease and the demand will increase in the ﬁrst period. However, because e S(P) > f D(P),
it is possible for the ﬁrst period voluntary transaction to expand as a result of this arbitrage,
and hence e Qd
1 > e Q. Since the increment in transaction is voluntary and the ﬁrst period
price is ﬁxed, there must be a Pareto improvement. A fortiori, the anticipated dual track
liberalization is also eﬃciency–enhancing. A similar argument can be made with respect to
the case when P e < P and f D(P) > e S(P). We conclude:
Proposition 6 Suppose that the government sets the price with infra-marginal agents par-
ticipating in the exchange involuntarily. Then anticipated dual track liberalization is Pareto
improving if and only if one of the following holds:
a. P e > P and e S0(P) ¸ f D(P)
b. P e < P and f D0(P) ¸ e S(P)
Proof. The argument is identical to the proof of Proposition 5 once we redeﬁne D as f D,
and S as e S. QED.
Considering Figure 6, if e S0(P) < f D(P), the transaction in the ﬁrst period will decrease
when the liberalization is anticipated. Consequently, some additional users will be rationed
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Figure 6: Price control and involuntary participation/exclusion
out in the ﬁrst period and hence made worse oﬀ. They will be made worse oﬀ in the
second period as compared to the status quo because they have to pay the free-market
price P e > P if they choose to transact. This means that a Pareto improvement cannot be
achieved. However, the liberalization could remain eﬃciency enhancing, since the eﬃciency
gains from removing involuntary participation can be arbitrarily large.
5 Conclusions
We began our discussion pointing out that when dual track liberalization is not anticipated,
it achieves a Pareto improving outcome, requiring very little information by the government.
These characteristics make such a reform mechanism particularly appealing, and potentially
applicable well beyond the scope of the Chinese economic transition, during which it has
been developed. This lead us to ask a question, relevant both from the point of view of the
theory of reform design, as well as for everyday policy making: Are there limits to dual track
liberalization? If so, what are these limits, and in which institutional context is dual track
most likely to be successful?
23To address this question, we have examined the working of dual track liberalization in a
wide range of institutional environments that span from a command to a regulated market
economy. In doing so, we have kept in mind that the key purpose of this mechanism is
to implement a reform without losers, and hence to obtain widespread political support
for a liberalization process. We have noted that reforms seeking popular support are often
the subject of public scrutiny prior to their actual implementation, and accordingly, they
are more likely to be rationally anticipated than to come as a surprise. We have therefore
extended the work of Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) by considering a two-period model,
where dual track liberalization is rationally anticipated in the ﬁrst period but implemented
in the second.
Using a simple partial equilibrium framework, we have studied the dynamic implications
of such a reform mechanism in a variety of economic environments. We have learned that
when the original government policy involves only price or quantity controls, dual track
liberalization is unlikely to continue to be simultaneously eﬃciency – enhancing and Pareto
improving.
However, when the status quo policy involves both price-setting and quantity restrictions,
a situation which we refer to as dual interventions, there exists a clear set of conditions under
which anticipated dual track liberalization will continue to be both eﬃciency–enhancing and
Pareto–improving. Such pervasive government interventions ﬁt the pre-reform institutional
characteristics of many transition economies. For dual track liberalization to be successful
in a more general context, our analysis shows that either the reform should be implemented
as a surprise or, when it is anticipated, it must involve the simultaneous removal of both
price and quantity controls.
While the general purpose of this paper is to understand the applicability of the dual track
scheme, we have discussed the issue by considering its applicability to a regulated market
economy and at the implications of allowing agents to anticipate such a reform. It might
be worthwhile to explore the limits of dual track liberalization from other perspectives, for
24instance taking into account the enforceability and credibility issues.7 Although enforcement
and credibility are important in assessing the implementability of the dual track mechanism,
we will leave these issues to future research.
7Indeed, when the pre-existing contractual agreements are only imperfectly enforceable, the diﬀerence
between the ﬁrst period price, and the free-market price would induce agents not to honor the pre-existing
contracts. Thus, under imperfect enforcement, the dual track scheme must ensure that the resulting diﬀerence
between these two prices are not too large, in order to avoid an ineﬃcient diversion of resources (Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992)). This may force the government to either continue to exert some control over
the price in the market track or adjust the price in the regulated track to accommodate the price increase in
the market track. Indeed, at the initial stage of China’s dual track reform, some of the prices in the market
sector are adjustable only within a band around the price in the plan sector. The band was lifted only at
later stages.
25Appendix
Proof of Corollary 1
Also in this case, we prove the result if supply is binding using Figure 1. Focusing on
the area below P e (the argument for the area above is symmetric and therefore is omitted),
we notice that the triangle BEC represents the gain of the dual track liberalization in the
second period, while the trapezoid ABEF represents the loss in the ﬁrst period. We denote
by ∆BEC the area of BEC etc. We want to show that ±∆BEC < ∆ABEF. From the arbitrage
condition (1), ±AD = DF. Since ±BC = DE = AB, ∆ABED = 2±∆BEC. Therefore,
∆ABED > ±∆BEC, and ∆ABEF > ±∆BEC. The same argument applies to the case of binding
demand. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof for the eﬃciency part of the results is similar to that of Proposition 1 and is
therefore omitted. We focus on conditions under which all private agents can be at least as
well oﬀ as under the status quo, an outcome which will occur if and only if the ﬁrst period
price remains constant despite the anticipated introduction of dual track liberalization.
Let P d
1S be the equilibrium price received by the suppliers in the ﬁrst period, when dual
track liberalization is anticipated, and let P d
1D be the price paid by buyers. As usual, let P be
the price received in the status quo by the producer, P ¡s be the price paid by the consumer
and Q be the quantity transacted. Naturally, P = S¡1(Q) and P ¡s = D¡1(Q). The prices
faced by buyers and suppliers will not change under anticipated dual track liberalization if
and only if
P
d
1S = S
¡1(Q) and P
d
1D = D
¡1(Q): (10)
Inter–temporal arbitrage implies that in equilibrium:
P
d
1S ¡ S
¡1(Q
d
1) = ±(P
e ¡ P
d
1S) (11)
P
d
1D ¡ D
¡1(Q
d
1) = ±(P
e ¡ P
d
1D): (12)
26Substituting (10) into the equations above, we have:
±S
¡1(Q
e) + S
¡1(Q
d
1) = (1 + ±)S
¡1(Q); (13)
±D
¡1(Q
e) + D
¡1(Q
d
1) = (1 + ±)D
¡1(Q): (14)
QED.
Proof of Corollary 2
We will start showing proving part a) ﬁrst. Assume that D = c ¡ dQ and S = a + bQ,
where a;b;c;d are positive constants. We can then rewrite equations 14 and 13 as
b(Q
d
1 ¡ Q) = ±b[Q ¡ Q
e] (15)
¡d(Q
d
1 ¡ Q) = ¡±d[Q ¡ Q
e] (16)
and obviously Qd
1 = (1+±)Q¡±Qe satisﬁes both equations simultaneously. To prove part b),
assume the demand is inﬁnitely elastic between Qd
1 and Qe. Equation (14) is then satisﬁed
for all Qd
1 in the relevant range, and Qd
1 is determined from equation (13). The argument is
identical for the case of supply.
References
Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991). Why are stabilizations delayed? American Economic
Review 81, 1170–1188.
Byrd, W. A. (1991). The Market mechanism and economic reforms in China. Armonk,
New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe.
Chai, J. C. (1997). China: Transition to a market Economy. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Dewatripont, M. and G. Roland (1992a). Economic reform and dynamic political con-
27straints. Review of Economic Studies 59, 703–730.
Dewatripont, M. and G. Roland (1992b). The virtues of gradualism and legitimacy in the
transition to a market economy. Economic Journal 102, 291–300.
Dewatripont, M. and G. Roland (1995). The design of reform packages under uncertainty.
American Economic Review 85, 1207–1223.
Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991). Resistance to reform: Status quo bias in the presence
of individual speciﬁc uncertainty. American Economic Review 81, 1146–1155.
Hammond, P. J. (1979). Straightforward individual incentive compatibility in large
economies. Review of Economic Studies 46, 263–282.
Lau, L. J., Y. Qian, and G. Roland (1997). Pareto-improving economic reforms through
dual-track liberalization. Economics Letters 55, 285–292.
Lau, L. J., Y. Qian, and G. Roland (2000). Reform without Losers: An interpretation of
China’s dual-track approach to transition. Journal of Political Economy 108, 120–143.
Li, W. (1999). A Tale of two reforms. Rand Journal of Economics 30, 120–136.
Murphy, K. M., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1992). The transition to a market economy:
Pitfalls of partial reform. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 889–906.
Wu, J. and R. Zhao (1987). The dual pricing system in china’s industry. Journal of Com-
parative Economics 11, 309–318.
Zhang, W. (1985). The reform of prices and the economic system. In W. Zhang (Ed.),
China: Development and Reform 1984-85, pp. 690–696. Beijing, PRC: Zhon Yang
Dang Xiao Press.
28 
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF 2/26/04 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 661: Dual track liberalization: With and without losers¤  Jiahua Che and Giovanni 
Facchini 
Feb. 2004 
No. 660: Who Is in Favor of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for 
EU Membership in the Candidate Countries’ Referenda 
Orla Doyle and Jan Fidrmuc  Feb. 2004 
No. 659: Creditor Moral Hazard in Sovereign Bond Markets  Ayşe Y. Evrensel and Ali M. 
Kutan 
Feb. 2004 
No. 658: Worsening of the Asian Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame?  Brasukra G. Sudjana and Ali M. 
Kutan 
Feb. 2004 
No. 657: European Integration, Productivity Growth and Real 
Convergence 
Taner M. Yigit and Ali M. Kutan  Feb. 2004 
No. 656: The Impact of News, Oil Prices, and Global Market 
Developments on Russian Financial Markets 
Bernd Hayo and Ali M. Kutan  Feb. 2004 
No. 655: Politics and Economic Reform in Malaysia  Bryan K. Ritchie  Feb. 2004 
No. 654: The Evolution of Income Inequality in Rural China  Dwayne Benjamin, Loren Brandt 
and John Giles 
Feb. 2004 
No. 653: The Sources of Real Exchange Fluctuations in 
Developing Countries : an Econometric Investigation 
Imed Drine and Christophe Rault  Feb. 2004 
No. 652: Ownership, Control and Corporate Performance After  
Large-Scale Privatization 
Jan Hanousek, Evzen Kocenda 
and Jan Svejnar 
Feb. 2004 
No. 651: Czech Social Reform/Non-reform: Routes, Actors and 
Problems 
Jiri Vecernik  Feb. 2004 
No. 650: Financial Integration, Exchange Rate Regimes in CEECs, 
and Joining the EMU: Just Do It... 
Maurel Mathilde  Feb. 2004 
No. 649: Corporate Investments, Liquidity and Bank Financing: 
Empirical Evidence from an Emerging Market 
Arun Khanna  Feb. 2004 
No. 648: Financial Constraints in Investment – Foreign Versus 
Domestic Firms.  Panel Data Results From Estonia, 1995-1999. 
Tomasz Mickiewicz, Kate Bishop 
and Urmas Varblane 
Feb. 2004 
No. 647: Legal Minimum Wages and the Wages of Formal and Informal 
Sector Workers in Costa Rica 
T. H. Gindling and Katherine 
Terrell 
Feb. 2004 
No. 646: Employment Expectations and Gross Flows by Type of Work 
Contract 
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Miguel Á. Malo 
Jan. 2004 
No. 645: Transition on the Shop Floor - The Restructuring of a Weaving 
Mill, Hungary 1988-97 
János Köllő Jan.  2004 
No. 644: Fighting “Low Equilibria” by Doubling the Minimum Wage ? 
Hungary’s Experiment 
Gábor Kertei and János Köllő Jan.  2004 
No. 643: Mind the Break! Accounting for Changing Patterns of Growth 
during Transition 
Jan Fidrmuc and Ariane Tichit  Jan. 2004 
No. 642: The Monetary Approach to Exchange Rates in the CEECs  Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma, Jarko 
Fidrmuc and Ronald MacDonald 
Jan. 2004 
No. 641: Community Norms and Organizational Practices: The 
Legitimization of Wage Arrears in Russia, 1992-1999 
John S. Earle, Andrew Spicer and 
Klara Sabirianova Peter 
Jan. 2004 
No. 640: Trust in Transition: Cross Country and Firm Evidence  Martin Raiser, Alan Rousso, and 
Franklin Steves 
Jan. 2004 
No. 639: What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Capital, 
Technical Assistance, and the Business Environment in Romania 
J. David Brown, John S. Earle 
and Dana Lup 
Jan. 2004 
No. 638: The Politics of Economic Reform in Thailand: Crisis and 
Compromise 
Allen Hicken  Jan. 2004 
No. 637: How Much Restructuring did the Transition Countries 
Experience?  Evidence from Quality of their Exports 
Yener Kandogan  Jan. 2004 
No. 636: Estimating the Size and Growth of Unrecorded Economic 
Activity in Transition Countries: A Re-Evaluation of Eclectric 
Consumption Method Estimates and their Implications 
Edgar L. Feige and Ivana Urban  Dec. 2003 
No. 635: Measuring the Value Added by Money  Vlad Ivanenko  Nov. 2003 
 